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CAROL REARDON
The Battle of Gettysburg has inspired a more voluminous literature than any 
single event in American military history for at least three major reasons. 
First, after three days of fighting on July 1-3, 1863, General Robert E. Lee's 
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and Major General George 
G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac lost more than 51,000 dead, wounded, 
captured, and missing, making Gettysburg the costliest military engagement 
in North American history. Second, President Abraham Lincoln endowed 
Gettysburg with special distinction when he visited in November 1863 to 
dedicate the soldiers’ cemetery and delivered his immortal Gettysburg 
Address. Finally, Gettysburg gave the Union its first significant victory over 
General Lee; the subsequent euphoria helped to fix in popular memory - if 
not in objective history - an enduring image of Gettysburg as the turning 
point of the Civil War.
12.1 The Confederacy’s Strategic Challenges in 
mid-1863
In the late spring of 1863, the Confederacy faced a deteriorating strategic 
environment. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s Union forces had 
surrounded Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton’s Confederate army 
at Vicksburg, a key Mississippi River port, and General Joseph E. 
Johnston’s relief force had proven unable to raise the siege; substantial 
Union ground and naval forces probed General P. G. T. Beauregard’s 
Confederate troops around Charleston, South Carolina; Major General 
William S. Rosecrans’s Union army challenged Confederate general 
Braxton Bragg in middle and eastern Tennessee; and Union forces near 
Suffolk, Virginia threatened Richmond itself. General Lee watched these 
developments closely and in April advised Confederate secretary of war 
James A. Seddon that "the readiest method of relieving pressure on
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General Johnston and General Beauregard would be for this army to cross 
into Maryland” and head north.1 2
1 Clifford Dowdey and Louis Manarin (eds.), The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee 
(New York: Bramhall House, 1961), p. 430.
2 Dowdey and Manarin (eds.), Wartime Papers, p. 438.
3 Dowdey and Manarin (eds.), Wartime Papers, pp. 434-5.
Lee also faced dire challenges of his own, especially a serious shortage of 
for his army and its animals. He could not tap into large parts of the 
Shenandoah Valley, the heart of Virginia’s agricultural production, now under 
Union military occupation. Two years of war had devastated farms in Virginia’s 
Tidewater and Piedmont, as well. By mid-April, Lee wrote his wife that he 
needed to “establish our supplies on a firm basis,” and opportunity beckoned 
after Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph 
Hooker at Chancellorsville on May 1-3, 1863? Despite the loss of 13,000 men 
and the death of Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall” Jackson, Lee 
informed his civilian superiors that the time had come for a northward advance 
by his army to sweep Union troops from the Shenandoah Valley, to push the 
Army of the Potomac out of Virginia, and to give the state’s farmers a chance 
to plant and harvest a crop. Additionally, he argued, the disruption caused by 
such a campaign would afford “greater relief’ to the Confederate “armies in 
middle Tennessee and on the Carolina coast than by any other method.”3
Brief snippets in postwar memoirs suggest that Lee’s plan did not win the 
immediate support of the Confederacy's senior military and political leaders, 
and other alternatives - including sending Lee himself or parts of his army to 
the western theater - received active consideration before President Davis 
finally gave the nod to Lee’s offensive into Union territory. No detailed minutes 
survive to explain or prioritize the factors that shaped the discussions, however, 
and since Lee started his summer offensive with no public announcement from 
the Davis administration, the public press speculated extensively about the 
goals of the campaign. Credible suppositions - including Lee’s desire to 
improve his logistical base and take active operations onto Northern soil - 
blended with grandiose claims for designs to capture Washington, to forge 
formal alliances with European powers, to force Grant to lift the siege at 
Vicksburg and redeploy his troops against Lee, or even to force Lincoln to 
surrender by completely destroying the Army of the Potomac on northern soil.
The lack of clear specifics for Lee’s campaign extended to his plans for his 
army’s goals in Pennsylvania. After reorganizing his army followingjackson’s 
death from two corps into three - under his second-in-command, Lieutenant 
General James Longstreet, and newly promoted lieutenant generals Richard
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S. Ewell and A. P. Hill - he ordered his army northward on June 3. Lee • 
no formal commander’s intent to inform the actions of his senior sub^jJ 
nates. Nor did he make a public announcement to Pennsylvanians to e 
his army’s presence as he had done during the Maryland campaign in 
One major criticism of Lee’s generalship in the summer of 1863 centers on bi. 
failure to send his 75,000-man army into Pennsylvania with a clearly defin 
mission. Lee left behind an evidentiary void that authors of Gettysbu 
campaign narratives have filled with both reasonable assumptions about hf 
logistical concerns and more dubious notions such as his intention to capture 
eastern Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal fields.4
4 See Army and Navy Journal, vol. 1, October 10, 1863.
5 For the text of Special Orders Nos. 72 and 73, see United States War Department, The War 
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 127 
vols., index, and atlas (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 
specifically series I, volume 27, part 3, pp. 912-13 and 942-3 (hereafter cited as OR; all 
subsequent citations are of series 1 unless otherwise noted).
6 OR, 27(1): 35.
12.2 The Union Reaction to Lee’s Move North
General Hooker missed Lee’s initial northward moves, but his horsemen 
caught Major General James E. B. Stuart’s Confederate cavalry off guard near 
Brandy Station, Virginia on June 9, and sent them reeling. The setback did not 
deter Lee. He continued to push toward the Shenandoah Valley for the 
protection of the Blue Ridge Mountains. On June 14-15, Ewell’s 2nd Corps 
at the head of Lee’s advance routed the Union garrison at Winchester. Ewell 
entered Pennsylvania on June 22, and his men gathered supplies so aggres­
sively that Lee issued two special orders to chastise his men for their 
"instances of forgetfulness.”5 For the next week, Confederate troops contin­
ued to fill their logistical needs, reached the outskirts of Harrisburg, and easily 
repulsed challenges from Pennsylvania’s Emergency Militia. Hooker initially 
considered a thrust toward the Confederate capital, but Lincoln reminded 
him sternly that "Lee’s army and not Richmond, is your sure objective 
point.”6 Hooker began his belated pursuit by sending his cavalry against 
the tail of Lee's army still in Virginia, but at Middleburg, Upperville, and 
Aldie, Stuart's Confederate horsemen effectively blocked them.
By June 27, with Lee already in Pennsylvania, Hooker had finally entered 
Maryland. Under War Department pressure to pursue more aggressively, 
Hooker sent a sharply worded dispatch demanding reinforcements and expan­
sion of his authority. Early on June 28, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
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J Hooker of command of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him 
^'^ajor General George G. Meade. The order also provided Meade with 
***“ fing wo-part mission; he had to protect Washington and Baltimore, as 
3 * gjjj and fight Lee. With incomplete knowledge of the deployment of 
W ano men in his seven-infantry corps and cavalry - and even less 
“ nation on Lee’s troops - he nonetheless issued orders to resume the 
ch toward Pennsylvania the day following his promotion. Selective reading 
°f Meade’s initial orders enabled detractors to describe his contingency plan for 
defensive stand along Pipe Creek on the Maryland border as evidence of his 
] ck of aggressiveness; but Meade understood both his offensive and defensive 
fissions and expressed clear willingness to “assume the offensive from this 
place” should opportunity offer.7 8
7 George Gordon Meade (ed.), The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major General, 
United States Army, 2 vols. (1913; reprint edition, Baltimore, MD: Butternut and Blue, 
1994), vol. 11, p. 11.
8 OR, 27(2): 316.
On June 30, Meade sent Brigadier General John Buford’s 2,800-man cavalry 
division to Gettysburg to find and report back on Lee’s movements. Buford's 
troopers fanned out to the north, east, and west along seven of the ten roads 
that converged in this crossroads town. They reported a strong Confederate 
presence north and west of town and exchanged shots with reconnoitering 
Confederate infantry along the Chambersburg Road west of town. Buford 
correctly predicted to Meade that a fight would start near Gettysburg the next 
morning.
12.3 July 1: The Battle Begins
When Lee heard of Meade's promotion, the Army of Northern Virginia 
stretched from the Maryland border near Hagerstown north to 
Chambersburg and then east to the outskirts of Harrisburg. Lee lacked 
reliable information about the Army of the Potomac’s activities and inten­
tions. Because Stuart had interpreted Lee’s June 23 orders to "take position on 
the right [east] of our column” to justify a wide-ranging swing to the east of 
the entire Union army as well - a decision still hotly debated by students of 
the battle today - he had not kept Lee reliably updated on Meade’s 
movements? Thus, Lee prudently ordered his overstretched army to con­
centrate near Cashtown, Pennsylvania, about 8 miles northwest of 
Gettysburg. His corps commanders knew not to bring on a fight until the 
entire force had arrived.
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Brigadier General Henry Heth’s division from A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps k I 
probed toward Gettysburg on June 30 and engaged with Buford’s tro 1 
mistaking them for local militia. Early on July 1, they advanced again do ’ 
the Chambersburg Road and once again met Buford’s men, this time 
Marsh Creek, approximately 3 miles west of Gettysburg. A brief exchange^ 
shots here started the Battle of Gettysburg at approximately 7:00 a.m
The terrain west of Gettysburg rolled across a series of gentle ridges ideal 
for defense. On McPherson’s Ridge, 1 mile west of town, Buford established 
the line he determined to hold and sent back a constant stream of information 
to update Major General Meade and Major General John F. Reynolds 
commanding the I Corps, the closest Union reinforcements. On Seminary 
Ridge, the final height between McPherson’s Ridge and Gettysburg, Buford 
used the cupola of the Pennsylvania Lutheran Seminary's Old Dorm to 
observe Heth’s advance and the measured withdrawal of his troopers to 
McPherson’s Ridge. As pressure grew on the outnumbered cavalrymen - 
Heth had put two full infantry brigades into his first line - Reynolds finally 
reached the battlefield and took charge of the fight. His arrival changed the 
asymmetric infantry-versus-cavalry meeting engagement of the early morn­
ing to a more conventional and sustained infantry clash. Even if Heth had not 
sought a fight, he now faced one.
Reynolds had no time to plan a battle. He simply responded to the threat in 
his front and tried to stop Heth. About 10:45, while ordering his famous Iron 
Brigade against the Tennesseans and Alabamians pouring into a woodlot on 
McPherson’s Ridge, Reynolds fell dead, shot through the head. Major 
General Abner Doubleday, the I Corps’ senior division commander, suc­
ceeded to command with little knowledge of the situation or Reynolds's 
intentions. The Iron Brigade cleared the woods and bought Doubleday time 
to consider his options - attack, withdraw, or hold on - while other I Corps 
troops stopped a brigade of Mississippians and North Carolinians in the bed of 
an unfinished railroad on the north side of the Chambersburg Road, captur­
ing several hundred Confederates. Noon brought a brief calm for Doubleday 
and Heth to decide their next moves; both determined to continue the fight 
for McPherson’s Ridge.
The sudden arrival around noon of substantial Confederate reinforce­
ments broke the quiet. Major General Robert E. Rodes’s division from 
Ewell’s 2nd Corps had planned to rejoin Lee near Cashtown, but the sounds 
of Heth’s fight against the Union I Corps drew them instead toward 
Gettysburg. As they emerged from the woods on Oak Hill, a height just 
north of McPherson’s Ridge, the two generals realized they held a seemingly
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' & pOSition to envelop the right flank of Doubleday’s I Corps. Ewell,
Per pr still operating under orders not to engage until the army concen- 
® faced an interesting choice: obey his original instructions, or take 
^vantage of a promising opportunity to attack.
“ t Ewell turned Oak Hill into a formidable artillery platform. Then, he 
dered Rodes to assault the right flank of the I Corps line, which, he 
believed, rested in a woodlot on a slight ridge extending south from Oak 
plill now designated Oak Ridge. Rodes planned a coordinated attack of three 
brigades, with Colonel Edward A. O’Neal’s Alabamians on the left, Brigadier 
general Alfred Iverson’s North Carolina brigade in the center, and Brigadier 
Junius Daniel’s North Carolinians on the right.
The plan seemed reasonable and straightforward, but it fell apart from 
series of inexplicable errors. O’Neal’s Alabamians attacked first and alone. 
They attacked through low ground behind Oak Ridge, expecting little 
resistance. When they found an entire I Corps brigade in a line of battle 
blocking them and then spotted the head of Major General Oliver 
0 Howard’s newly arrived XI Corps entering the fields north of 
Gettysburg and threatening their left flank, the Alabamians fired a few volleys 
and withdrew. O’Neal failed to report these unanticipated developments to 
Rodes or Ewell, and Iverson and Daniel advanced still believing they aimed at 
an unprotected Union flank. Unfortunately for Iverson’s men, the Union 
troops who repulsed O’Neal redeployed behind the crest of Oak Ridge and 
caught the Tar Heels in close-range volleys. Nearly half of them fell dead or 
wounded within fifteen minutes, and Iverson, who had remained on Oak 
Hill, refused to ride forward to rally the survivors. Daniel’s brigade could not 
succor them either. Instead of advancing westward, they unaccountably 
veered south, away from Oak Ridge and toward the railroad cut and the 
Chambersburg Pike. This costly episode - as with the debacle at the railroad 
cut - demonstrated that overall Confederate success could also include 
individual and small-unit failures.9
The arrival of Howard’s XI Corps certainly complicated Ewell’s decisions, 
but it also gave the Union forces at Gettysburg its fourth different comman­
der on July i. He astutely left Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr’s 
division on Cemetery Hill, a prominent treeless elevation on the southern 
edge of Gettysburg, to establish a strong defensive position to serve, if
9 Robert K. Krick, "Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade 
Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg,” in Gary W. Gallagher (ed.), The First Day 
at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 1992). pp. 92-140.
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needed, as a rallying point. Howard then ordered Doubleday to cont' J 
holding the I Corps line west of Gettysburg on McPherson’s Ridge He th16 
turned his attention to Ewell’s approach from the north. While Rodes’ s ITlpn 
pressed their attacks from Oak Hill northwest of town, Howard learned k ** 
Major General Jubal Early’s division under Ewell’s corps had begun to dep| ' 
battle lines astride the Harrisburg Road northeast of Gettysburg. How i 
quickly ordered his remaining two divisions under Major General Qa ] 
Schurz and Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow to positions north of th 
town to stop Ewell. Both division commanders were military amateurs and 
their dispositions showed it. Schurz failed to close a gap between his left flank 
and the right flank of the I Corps, and the strength of the two XI Corps 
divisions combined proved insufficient to cover the front assigned to them 
Barlow created an additional gap between his division and Schurz by advan 
cing against orders to take possession of a knob of high ground in his front
As Howard completed his dispositions, General Lee reached the battle­
field. From his position west of Gettysburg, he could not see Howard and 
Ewell’s lines north of Gettysburg, but he had received enough positive news 
to abandon his intention to concentrate his army before accepting battle 
At mid-afternoon, Lee ordered an attack along his entire line, from northeast 
to northwest to west.
When Early launched his assault on Barlow’s division northeast of 
Gettysburg, the troops on the right flank of the XI Corps line were unpre­
pared to receive the attack. Barlow fell badly wounded and many of his 
soldiers broke for the rear, significant numbers of them captured in the 
unfamiliar streets of Gettysburg. Northern newspapers of the day blamed 
the entire XI Corps - not just Barlow’s division - for repeating their collapse 
at Chancellorsville, when they crumbled under Stonewall Jackson’s flank 
attack. Once again, the press labeled them as "Howard’s Cowards,” the 
“Flying Half-moons” from their crescent-shaped corps badge, or, in reference 
to the significant number of German-bom soldiers in its ranks, the “Flying 
Dutchmen.”10 But the entire XI Corps did not deserve such opprobrium. 
Schurz’s men on the center and left of Howard’s line north of town stood fire 
io For a comprehensive perspective that sees beyond questions relating to ethnicity, see 
A. Wilson Greene, "From Chancellorsville to Cemetery Hill: O. O. Howard and 
Eleventh Corps Leadership," in Gallagher (ed.), First Day at Gettysburg, pp. 57-91.
well and, for a while, effectively resisted Ewell’s assaults. In the end, how­
ever, the XI Corps line north of town evaporated. The retreat of Howard’s XI 
Corps rendered vulnerable the right flank of the I Corps line on Oak Ridge. 
With victorious Confederates pushing into Gettysburg from the north, Rodes
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I ched a second attafk fr°m ^a^ '[’le Union troops had little remain-
^^^Hiunition, and they finally received orders to abandon their posi- 
^The center and left of the I Corps line continued to hold McPherson’s 
west of town. Daniel’s North Carolinians, who had failed to support 
found themselves embroiled in a tough fight against a newly arrived 
de of Pennsylvanians under Colonel Roy Stone near the railroad cut and 
. McPherson farm buildings. Few of the Pennsylvanians had seen serious 
battle action before Gettysburg, but they faced north to repulse several 
saiilts by Daniel’s Tar Heels and then redeployed under fire to face west 
receive the attack by a fresh brigade from Heth’s division. To their 
tnmediate south, the Iron Brigade continued to fight in the woodlot where 
General Reynolds fell earlier that day. Their fight against Brigadier General 
James Johnston Pettigrew’s North Carolinians on the afternoon of July 1 
holds a prominent place in Gettysburg lore. Before it ended, the Iron 
Brigade’s 24th Michigan alone lost eight officers killed and nearly 80 percent 
of its men killed, wounded, and missing. One company of the 26th North 
Carolina entered the fight with eighty-eight men in ranks and suffered 
100 percent casualties. After about two hours of fighting, the survivors of 
all the I Corps infantry brigades that fought that day on McPherson’s Ridge - 
along with a massed battery of seventeen cannon astride the Chambersburg 
Road - made a last stand on Seminary Ridge. At about 3:45 p.m., Lee sent 
forward Major General W. Dorsey Pender's fresh division of Hill’s 3rd Corps 
to carry the position. The Union defenders held on until Colonel 
Abner M. Perrin's South Carolinians finally pierced the center of the Union 
line near the Seminary’s Old Dorm.11
ii J. Michael Miller, "Perrin’s Brigade on July i, 1863,” Gettysburg Magazine, no. 13 (July 
1995): 22-32.
By about 4:00 p.m., the Union line north and west of Gettysburg had 
collapsed, and Cemetery Hill south of town teemed with disorganized 
survivors. Near the gatehouse of Evergreen Cemetery, Doubleday and 
Howard clashed over troop deployments and command authority. 
The arrival of Major General Winfield S. Hancock, commander of Meade’s 
II Corps, ended further debate. Carrying with him Meade’s written author­
ization to make decisions in his name - necessary, since both Howard and 
Doubleday outranked him - Hancock ordered Howard to hold Cemetery 
Hill and, over Doubleday's objections, sent one I Corps division to hold 
adjacent Culp’s Hill. Slowly, order was restored.
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About 5:00 p.m., observing the chaos on Cemetery Hill, Lee ordered 
to attack Cemetery Hill “if practicable” and without renewing a pro] 
fight. Ewell evaluated the situation, considered what he knew about ■ 
mostly what he did not know - and deemed Rodes’s and Early ’s division 
disorganized to mount another attack. He decided against making the 
Observers then and historians today still debate the correctness 
decision. °* his
Late on July 1, Lieutenant General Longstreet arrived at Lee’s head 
ters near the seminary. After congratulating Lee on his success that d 
Longstreet inquired about orders for his 1st Corps for the following mornin ’ 
He was surprised to learn that Lee intended to stay and fight at Gettysbur^ 
Longstreet later recalled that Lee had expressed a desire to launch an 
offensive campaign but to fight defensive battles on ground he chose Now 
he seemed to have abandoned that notion. When Lee asserted that if the 
Union army remained at Gettysburg in the morning, he would attack, 
Longstreet countered that if the Army of the Potomac still held its line 
then Meade wanted Lee to attack. Lee stood his ground, however, and 
Longstreet later recalled the exchange as one of the few times he ever saw 
Lee “lose his vaunted equipoise.”12
12 James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania,” in The Annals of the War (Philadelphia: 
Philadelphia Weekly, 1879), p. 434.
12.4 July 2
As Lee settled in for the night, Major General Meade finally reached 
Gettysburg about midnight. After speaking with several senior subordinates, 
he ordered the entire Army of the Potomac to close on Gettysburg. He made 
his first thorough reconnaissance of the battlefield at first light on July 2. After 
considering - and quickly rejecting - an attack option, he designed 
a defensive line that soon became known as “the fishhook.” The pointed 
barb of the hook rested near Culp’s Hill, and Major General Henry 
W. Slocum's XII Corps joined the I Corps troops sent there by Hancock to 
defend it. The bend in the hook rested on Cemetery Hill, where Howard’s XI 
Corps remained in place. The long shank of the fishhook extended south 
from Cemetery Hill along a height known as Cemetery Ridge; Hancock’s II 
Corps held the line immediately south of Cemetery Hill, and Major General 
Daniel E. Sickles’s III Corps filled the southern extension of the ridge. Little 
Round Top, its western slope recently deforested, stood just north of Big
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I A ToP tW° anc'loring Meade's fishhook. When his V and VI 
R°url arrived, Meade could use them to strengthen any part of his line or 
CoT^m jn reserve. In Napoleonic terms, Meade had fashioned an inher- 
ho1^ strong interior line, about 4 miles long.
eI1^ July 2 dawned, however, Lee found himself in the unfamiliar position 
his numerically inferior army on an exterior line that ultimately 
ifed for 7 miles, beginning east of Culp’s Hill, continuing westward 
^ugh Gettysburg, and then reaching south along Seminary Ridge. About 
ile separated Seminary Ridge from the shank of the Union fishhook on 
1 metery Ridge. Lee still planned to fight, and - because Stuart still remained 
bsent-he ordered Captain Samuel Johnston, a staff engineer, to reconnoiter 
. Union dispositions. Just where Johnston went and what he saw remain 
one of Gettysburg’s great mysteries. In any case, he reported the presence of 
Union troops on the hills just south of Gettysburg, noted more troops 
extending partway down Cemetery Ridge, and claimed that the Round 
Tops remained unoccupied.
Based onjohnston’s flawed report, Lee developed his battle plan for July 2. 
He assigned the main effort to Longstreet’s 1st Corps, intending for them to 
move south of Gettysburg and then attack northward along the Emmitsburg 
Road toward the town to roll up the left flank of the Union line along 
Cemetery Ridge and take Cemetery Hill in reverse. To coordinate with 
Longstreet, Lee ordered Ewell to use his 2nd Corps to initiate a diversion - 
with the option to turn it into a full-fledged attack - against Culp’s Hill and 
Cemetery Hill. A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps held Lee’s center, its mission to support 
Longstreet and Ewell.13
13 OR, 27(2): 318.
Longstreet once again expressed strong opposition to Lee’s plan. When he 
failed to change Lee’s mind, he reported that only the divisions of Major 
General Lafayette McLaws and Lieutenant General John Bell Hood had 
reached Gettysburg; Major General George Pickett’s division had not 
arrived. Lee permitted Longstreet a brief delay for Hood’s final brigade to 
arrive and made up for Pickett’s absence by giving Longstreet authority over 
Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill’s 3rd Corps. Still,
Longstreet did not begin to move into position until about 11:00 a.m. Lee had 
expressed a desire that Longstreet move with both speed and secrecy, and 
when McLaws reported that his route took them in view of a Union signal 
station on Little Round Top, Longstreet ordered a countermarch that better 
sheltered their march, delaying the attack further. About 3:30, when
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Longstreet’s troops finally reached the western slope of Seminary Ridge w 
south of Gettysburg, he asked McLaws how he planned to deploy his ]ea(j 
division for the attack. McLaws stated his intention to crest the ridge, march 
eastward until astride the Emmitsburg Road, face his line to the north the 
attack to roll up the left flank of the Union line. When the Confederate 
reached the top of Seminary Ridge and saw their intended battleground 
however, they immediately realized that it looked nothing like Captain 
Johnston had described it. A large peach orchard and the open fields alon 
the Emmitsburg Road, all reported as unoccupied, now teemed with Union 
troops.
These soldiers belonged to Sickles’s III Corps. Meade had ordered Sickles 
to hold the southern end of Cemetery Ridge and to cover Little Round Top 
but Sickles quickly realized that if he pushed out to the peach orchard and the 
Emmitsburg Road, he could deny Confederate batteries an advantageous 
position. He had abandoned such a position at Chancellorsville, and 
Confederate artillery rushed in and inflicted heavy losses on the III Corps- 
he did not want to repeat the experience. Twice Meade denied Sickles 
permission to move forward, but finally, about 2:00 p.m., the III Corps 
advanced without authority. Sickles placed one division along the 
Emmitsburg Road facing west. To cover Little Round Top, he faced 
his second division to the southwest, angling it back to fill the space between 
the road and the hill. Sickles’s action disrupted Meade's fishhook and isolated 
the III Corps from the rest of the Union army. Moreover, he had insufficient 
manpower to hold the left of his line. He left wide gaps between his troops in 
the peach orchard, those in the sizable Rose's Wheatfield, and those near the 
massive rock formation now known as Devil’s Den. Sickles’s new line also 
included an indefensible salient at the peach orchard that could be attacked 
from west and south simultaneously.
Regardless of these weaknesses, Sickles’s advance rendered unworkable 
Lee’s original orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Road and roll up the Union 
flank. Although Longstreet informed Lee of the significant changes in the 
military situation along this portion of the Union line since early morning, 
Lee refused to alter his initial plan. To match the new reality, Longstreet now 
deployed his troops to make a frontal assault against Sickles's entire line. 
While McLaws's men remained in place to attack Union troops at the peach 
orchard, where they initially had planned to deploy, Longstreet shifted Hood 
to McLaws’s right flank to attack the left of the III Corps line closest to the 
formidable Round Tops. Scouts reported a way around those hills that would 
threaten the Union rear area and reduce the need for frontal attacks. But Lee
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own impatient, and Longstreet ordered Hood to attack. Hood - one of 
, m0St aggressive subordinates - responded with the only formal protest 
^his military career.
^hen Meade learned of Sickles s forward movement, he rode out toward 
peach orchard, and, after a heated exchange with Sickles, ordered the III 
Corps back to its original position, with an important codicil: “if General Lee 
^11 jet yOu.” Just then, Longstreet’s artillery opened on Sickles’s line. Meade 
■ mediately changed Sickles’s orders, instructing him to hold his line, rather 
than risk a controlled withdrawal that might collapse under Confederate 
ressure and destroy the entire Union line. Meade then informed Sickles that 
he would support the III Corps line with reinforcements from quiet portions 
of the fishhook. Rival interpretations of Sickles’s actions and Meade’s 
response to them have fueled one of Gettysburg’s most heated controversies, 
and vitriolic postwar exchanges between supporters of each general still 
influence how historians evaluate this series of command decisions.
When Longstreet’s infantry assault began, Hood’s two leading brigades - 
the Alabamians under Brigadier General Evander M. Law and the Texas 
Brigade under Brigadier General Jerome B. Robertson - stepped off toward 
their respective objectives, Little Round Top and the left of Sickles’s III Corps 
line at Devil’s Den. Imperfectly understood orders, disruptive Union artillery 
fire, and the effective work of the US Sharpshooters on the skirmish line 
caused the two brigades to intermingle. Effective command and control 
broke down, as three of Law’s and two of Robertson’s regiments headed 
for Little Round Top, while two Alabama regiments and Robertson’s two 
remaining units closed in on Devil’s Den. Hood fell wounded early in the 
fight, leaving no senior commander to unsnarl the confusion.
On the crest of Little Round Top, an outstanding observation point, Major 
General Gouvemeur K. Warren, the Army of the Potomac’s chief engineer, 
spotted the gun barrels and bayonets of Longstreet’s men glinting in the late 
afternoon sunlight. Even before the attack started, Warren realized that the 
Confederate battle line extended well beyond the end of Sickles’s left flank on 
Devil’s Den. Except for a signal team, Warren stood nearly alone. As a staff 
officer, he had no authority to order combat troops to defend the hill, but 
Colonel Strong Vincent, ordered to take his 1,400-man brigade from the 
V Corps to reinforce the line in Rose’s Wheatfield, exercised his initiative 
to divert to Little Round Top.
Vincent’s four regiments quickly formed a battle line on the southern slope 
of Little Round Top, and their stand has become one of Gettysburg’s most 
famous episodes. The Confederates first attacked Vincent’s right flank and
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then moved to hit his center. The stand of Colonel Joshua Lawren 
Chamberlain’s 20th Maine on Vincent’s left flank and - at the time - 
left flank of the entire Army of the Potomac, however, generally receiy 
disproportionate attention. After several unsuccessful attempts by Law’ 
Alabamians to break Chamberlain’s line by frontal assault, the 15^ 
Alabama maneuvered around his left flank. The Maine colonel counted 
only 386 men in ranks, but he managed to refuse his left flank to allow it t0 
confront directly the new threat while the right half of his regiment 
continued to face south. When ammunition ran low, Chamberlain ordered 
his men to fix bayonets. As he reported it, he gave orders for the left of his line 
to charge down the hill, swing to the right - like a gate - and clear their front 
The exhausted Alabamians retreated in disorder when Chamberlain’s men 
hit, and the threat to Little Round Top and the Union left flank evaporated 
During the postwar years, Chamberlain and his soldiers seldom agreed on the 
details of the fight - or who deserved the credit for the victory - but nobody 
challenged the end result.
The same good fortune did not extend to Sickles’s advanced line. 
At Devil’s Den, Confederate attackers received unexpected reinforce­
ments. Brigadier General Henry L. Benning’s Georgia brigade should 
have followed Law’s Alabamians to Little Round Top, but in the confu­
sion of battle they entered the fight at Devil’s Den instead. The addition 
of Benning’s firepower helped to bring the Devil’s Den fight to a quick 
and victorious end for Southern arms. Sickles's overmatched Union 
defenders finally withdrew to Cemetery Ridge. The most intense fighting 
then shifted to John Rose’s nearby wheatfield, separated from Devil’s 
Den by a small woodlot. For complexity and confusion, no aspect of the 
Battle of Gettysburg defies analysis quite like the fight in the wheatfield. 
For about ninety minutes, the rival forces attacked and counterattacked 
through the trampled wheat and through the woods surrounding it. Like 
a series of crashing waves, troops from four separate Confederate bri­
gades were fed into the fight against soldiers from at least eleven Union 
brigades. Nowhere did Meade fulfill his intention to support Sickles’s line 
as completely as he did here; reinforcements from the II and V Corps 
reinforced the original III Corps defenders in close combat that at time 
flowed north and south and then east and west. Possession of the field 
may have changed six times and no single individual commander exerted 
control over it. In the end. Confederates held the western edge of the 
field, Union soldiers held the woods to the east, and over 6,000 men had 
fallen.
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ongstreet’s attack then progressed toward Sickles’s line along the 
tsburg Road. South Carolinians attacked the III Corps salient at the 
^ch orchard from the south while Brigadier General William Barksdale’s 
I*. issippians assaulted the position from the west. Union artillery broke the 
q rolinians’ attack, but Barksdale’s Mississippians could not be stopped.
e collapse of the peach orchard salient now rendered vulnerable the left 
flank of Sickles’s line along the Emmitsburg Road, and Longstreet now sent 
forward Anderson’s division - the 3rd Corps troops assigned by Lee to 
cooperate in Longstreet's main effort - to attack that line frontally. Lee’s 
initial plan to outflank and roll up the Union line had apparently been 
forgotten. As the III Corps readied to receive Anderson’s frontal attack, 
heavy Confederate artillery fire - some of it coming from batteries just 
arrived in the peach orchard as Sickles had feared - raked down their line 
from the left. The III Corps line on the Emmitsburg Road began to give way. 
In the chaos, a cannonball hit Sickles in the right leg, completely shattering it 
and requiring amputation.
Although it is often unappreciated, the Union army now faced a crisis. 
When Sickles moved forward from Cemetery Ridge, no other Union troops 
had filled the gap he left. Only a few hundred yards behind Sickles’s original 
line, nearly unprotected, lay the Taneytown Road, one of Meade's two lines 
of supply, communication, and, if needed, retreat. A hastily organized line of 
Union batteries bought time for Major General Hancock of the II Corps, 
commanding the nearest unengaged troops, to cobble together a battle line 
on south Cemetery Ridge to face Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox’s 
Alabamians and Colonel David Lang’s small brigade of Florida infantry 
from Anderson’s division of A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps. The sacrifice of the 1st 
Minnesota infantry - often cited as an 82 percent loss - often claims the 
spotlight, but other troops from the II Corps - and even regiments from the 
Union I and XII Corps, the latter sent by Meade from the quiet Union right 
flank on Culp’s Hill - helped to seal the breach here. After these troops 
repulsed the charge of Anderson’s third brigade to enter the fight, Brigadier 
General Ambrose Wright's Georgians - who some accounts claim reached 
the crest of Cemetery Ridge itself - the sun set shortly after 7:00 p.m., finally 
ending the Confederate main effort on July 2.
But quiet did not fall over the entire battlefield. Lee’s original orders 
required Ewell to launch a diversion on the Confederate left flank at the 
sound of Longstreet’s guns. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Ewell’s artillery on 
Benner’s Hill had opened against Union batteries on Cemetery Hill and 
Culp’s Hill. At twilight, after his guns fell silent - his batteries were entirely
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overmatched- Ewell ordered his infantry forward. He sent Major Geri I 
Edward Johnson’s division against Culp’s Hill. They did not realize that 6 J 
Meade had sent most of Slocum’s 10,000 soldiers to help Sickles 
a brigade of 1,500 New Yorkers under Brigadier General George S Gre^ 
held the hill. Greene, an engineer, had his men erect breastworks and cl 
a field of fire on the wooded slopes, giving him a decided advantage now th^ 
he faced at least 5,000 Confederate attackers. The sun fell as Johnson’ 
Confederates captured the lower half of Culp’s Hill. The upper half how 
ever, remained securely in Union hands, since Colonel David Ireland’s 137th 
New York- much like the 20th Maine on Little Round Top - refused its flank 
on the right of Greene’s line and fought off Confederate attacks from two 
directions. Ewell’s second assault targeted the northern and eastern slopes of 
Cemetery Hill. Two brigades - the Louisianans of Brigadier General Harry 
T. Hay and the Tar Heels of Colonel Isaac Avery - hit XI Corps brigades, still 
badly mauled by their fight on July 1, broke their line, and even captured 
Union cannon on the crest of the hill. But darkness and the timely arrival of 
reinforcements from Hancock’s II Corps finally repulsed the attackers 
The fighting on July 2, the battle’s costliest day, finally ended in darkness 
While Antietam still ranks as the Civil War’s bloodiest day, July 2 at 
Gettysburg remains a plausible candidate for the second position.
14 Two interesting accounts of the so-called “council of war” can be found in Meade (ed.), 
The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, vol. 11, p. 97; andjohn Gibbon, Recollections of 
the Civil War (New York: Putnam’s, 1928), p. 187. As junior officer present, Gibbon cast 
the first vote for each of the three questions so he could not be influenced by his 
superior's preferences.
12.5 July 3
As comparative quiet fell over the battlefield, the rival commanders followed 
far different courses. After only five days in command, two of them locked in 
battle, Major General Meade needed to know the state of his army and the 
state of mind of its key generals. He listened more than he talked at 
a midnight gathering of his senior commanders. Major General Daniel 
Butterfield, his chief of staff, then posed three questions. Should the army 
stand at Gettysburg or withdraw? Should the Army of the Potomac take the 
offensive or remain on the defensive? If the army stayed, but remained on the 
defensive, how long should they await Lee’s next move? Their consensus - 
stay, remain on the defensive, and reconsider options in twenty-four hours if 
Lee took no action - fully suited Meade's own preferences.14 Lee held no such
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ting with his senior commanders. He believed that July 2 had resulted in 
01 • 1 victories on both flanks. Although his army had suffered significant 
P he remained convinced that continued attacks against those weakened 
’°SS ts launched early in the morning, would bring decisive victory. As he 
P° in his report, for July 3, “the general plan was unchanged.”15
15 OR, 27(2): 320.
Artillery fire opened early, but Lee's guns did not break the silence. Late 
njuly 2> after suPPortinS Sickles, the XII Corps returned to Culp’s Hill and 
found Ewell’s men occupying some of their breastworks. With Meade’s 
rmission, Union batteries opened fire about 4:30 a.m. on Confederate 
oops on lower Culp’s Hill and near Spangler’s Spring at its base, 
-j-jre bombardment lasted only about fifteen minutes, but it prompted 
Ewell to launch his early-morning attack. From 5:00 a.m. until nearly 11:00 
a jn fierce fighting flared all along the line. At Spangler's Spring, 
a misunderstanding of orders to gather intelligence on the location of the 
Confederate line resulted in a needless frontal attack that resulted in the loss 
of several hundred Union soldiers. Union fortunes fared far better on Culp’s 
Hill itself, however, where Greene's original defenders, now heavily rein­
forced by the rest of the XII Corps and others, took full advantage of the 
protection their breastworks offered to throw back Ewell’s attack with heavy 
loss.
About 9:00 a.m., the duration and intensity of the Culp’s Hill fight - and 
Longstreet’s failure to match Ewell’s attack with his own offensive push 
against the Union left - convinced Lee to reevaluate his options. Suspecting 
that Meade had reinforced his flanks, Lee now considered an attack against 
the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet again respectfully dis­
agreed, offering his professional opinion that “no 15,000 men” arrayed for 
battle could break that line. Longstreet’s postwar detractors accused him of 
insubordination for resisting Lee’s plan; in reality, he responsibly fulfilled his 
obligation as the army’s second-in-command to critique and offer alternatives 
to high-risk plans. In the end, Lee decided to assault the Union center on 
Cemetery Ridge. His decision to do so still stands among the most contro­
versial aspects of his generalship at Gettysburg.
Lee fleshed out his new plan with four additional decisions. First, he 
designated the assault’s target, an area on Cemetery Ridge marked by 
a conspicuous clump (or copse) of trees. Second, to neutralize the numerous 
Union batteries, he took the unusual step of ordering a preliminary artillery 
bombardment before the infantry assault. Third, he assigned the troops to
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make the attack, selecting Pickett’s 5,500-man Virginia division frnJ 
Longstreet’s 1st Corps, the survivors of Heth’s division, and two bri J 
from Pender’s division, the latter two commands from Hill’s 3rd Qo^ 
While Pickett’s men were fresh, all of Hill’s units suffered heavily on I 
Heth’s men went into action on July 3 under temporary command of Genera] 
Pettigrew, and after Pender fell mortally wounded late on July 2 ]^a- 
General Isaac R. Trimble took command of his troops assigned to the char 
In total, approximately 13,000 infantry formed the attacking force. Finally 
Lee gave Longstreet command of the attack. Longstreet suggested that Le 
give the assignment to an officer who possessed greater confidence in the 
plan, but, after an awkward silence, he accepted his professional obligation to 
"adopt his views and execute his orders as faithfully as if they were mv 
»l6 Jown.
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Confederate artillery opened. Estimates of the 
bombardment’s duration range from ten minutes to four hours. Lee’s chief of 
artillery, Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, failed to manage ammuni­
tion resupply, and many Confederate shells overshot their marks. Still, Union 
batteries near the copse of trees suffered significant damage, and 
Confederates noticed that gun crews were removing damaged guns. Union 
artillerymen needed twenty to thirty minutes to replace damaged batteries 
with fresh ones. Could the Confederate infantry cross the valley between 
Seminary and Cemetery Ridge - not quite a mile - in that time?16 7
16 James Longstreet to A. B. Longstreet, July 24,1863, quoted in James Longstreet, "Lee in 
Pennsylvania," p. 414.
17 See Gary W. Gallagher (ed.), Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of 
General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1989), pp. 254-9; andjames Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil 
War in America (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1895), p. 392, for Confederate 
perspectives on the effectiveness of the bombardment.
Although Longstreet still opposed the charge - and even considered 
stopping it when he learned of the low supply of artillery ammunition - he 
finally nodded assent to Pickett’s request for orders to advance. Pickett’s 
Virginians deployed in a deep swale near the Henry Spangler farm in the 
valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges. Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s 
men emerged from the trees on Seminary Ridge nearly one-quarter mile 
north of Pickett’s men, pushing through the smoke of William Bliss’s burning 
farm buildings. The terrain between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges gently 
rolled, its hollows running north and south offering protection, especially to 
Pickett’s Virginians, during their advance. Additionally, a ripple of ground 
running west to east between the two ridges meant that Pickett’s division and
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>s and Trimble’s men advanced independently and out of sight of 
Pe otjier until they neared the Emmitsburg Road that ran across their front 
e3 ral hundred yards west of the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. 
SC On Cemetery Ridge, Major General John Gibbon’s division of Hancock’s II 
s deployed behind a stout stone wall that ran south to north in front of 
^^opSe of trees. Pickett’s Virginians advanced toward Gibbon’s command. 
he open area around the copse of trees became known as the Angle, since it 
encompassed by the stone wall on two sides; just north of the trees, the 
wall turned abruptly to the east and then after ioo yards, extended again to 
jjie north. Brigadier General Alexander Hays’s division held the II Corps line 
orth of the Angle, and Pettigrew's and Trimble’s troops mostly fought 
against this command. The distinctions are important for understanding 
the very different perspectives that participants bring to their accounts of 
• Pickett’s Charge.”
Until the attacking Confederates reached the Emmitsburg Road, Union 
artillery, including some fresh batteries, exacted the greatest cost. 
Controversy arose when Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, Meade’s chief of 
artillery, wanted to fire deliberately to conserve ammunition for the final 
Confederates push, while Major General Hancock insisted that his corps 
batteries maintain a high rate of fire to steel his men. Hancock won the 
argument on the field, but it continued for decades in print.18
18 See Francis A. Walker, "General Hancock and the Artillery at Gettysburg," in Robert 
U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. 
(New York: Century, 1884-9), vol. ill, pp. 385-6, andHenryJ. Hunt, “Rejoinder,” in ibid., 
hi, pp. 386-7, for opposing views.
By contrast, Union infantry held its fire until the Confederates came close 
enough for effective massed volleys. When soldiers on Gibbon’s left opened 
fire, they noticed Pickett’s troops shifting away from them and toward the 
clump of trees, wrongly attributing the action to the accuracy of their fire. 
Pickett's three brigades made this movement purposefully, however, with 
their commanders leading from the front. Brigadier General Richard
B. Garnett, on horseback against orders, fell dead when his men halted 
about 25 yards from the stone wall to fire their initial volley at Gibbon’s 
defenders. Brigadier General James L. Kemper, deployed to Garnett’s right, 
fell seriously wounded, his men rescuing him from near capture. Brigadier 
General Lewis A. Armistead brought up Pickett’s second line and led across 
the wall all the Virginians who would follow him. The Union line broke in 
two places as Confederate infantry - as many as 1,500 or perhaps only 
a handful - poured into the Angle. As the Union line stiffened and
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reinforcements arrived, Armistead fell mortally wounded. General Picj. 
who had accompanied his division as far as the Emmitsburg Road Sent.ett’ 
reinforcements to exploit the breach, but none came. After an intense fight ■ 
the Angle that lasted perhaps twenty minutes, three Vermont regi^ 
threatened to envelop Pickett’s right flank. Pickett pulled his men ba 
with a loss of approximately 60 percent of them. But “Pickett’s Cha ■■ 
was not a one-sided bloodletting. Some regiments in Gibbon’s division th 
fought at the Angle suffered losses that exceeded 40 percent, and both 
Hancock and Gibbon fell wounded.
Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s commands fared no better. They did not pene 
trate the Union line where Hays’s division held it, although some Mississippi 
troops later claimed they did. Indeed, according to Hays, the Confederate 
attack was repulsed even more quickly than it took him to write about it. Still 
as the fate of the nth Mississippi illustrates - its 592 men fought only on July 3 
and lost 312 - Pettigrew’s men did not give way without a fight. Pettigrew and 
Trimble both fell wounded. Colonel James K. Marshall - one of Pettigrew’s 
brigade commanders - was killed, another wounded and captured, and 
a third performed so poorly that he soon resigned. When Union troops 
enveloped the left of their line, however, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s survivors 
withdrew as well. General Lee met them all back on Seminary Ridge and 
accepted full responsibility for the attack.
The repulse of “Pickett’s Charge” ended the battle’s most intense infantry 
fighting. Four miles to the east of Gettysburg, however, Stuart’s Confederate 
cavalry - they had finally arrived at midday on July 2 - clashed with Union 
horsemen under Brigadier General David M. Gregg. Rival skirmish lines of 
dismounted troopers opened the fight. Stuart then ordered a mounted 
charge, one of the largest sabre-to-sabre clashes of the entire war, that 
newly promoted Brigadier General George A. Custer’s Michigan cavalry 
finally blunted. After the war, suggestions arose that Stuart had orders to 
attack the rear of Cemetery Ridge simultaneous with Pickett’s frontal assault, 
but no contemporary evidence supports the notion. At the same time, south 
of Gettysburg, Union troopers under newly promoted Brigadier General 
Wesley Merritt advanced northward up the Emmitsburg Road to threaten 
Lee’s left flank. A combined force of Confederate infantry and cavalry 
stopped Merritt, but near the base of Big Round Top - an extension of 
Merritt’s action along the road - Brigadier General Elon J. Farnsworth 
suffered a similar reverse. Farnsworth received orders to advance over 
rocky terrain that was not well suited to the operation of cavalry, leading 
to a heated exchange between Farnsworth and his superior. Ultimately,
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rth personally led his men forward and fell mortally wounded. 
farnsW between Stuart and Gregg, the cavalry fights on the southern
hery accomplished little. But they ended the battle.
12.6 The Retreat and Pursuit
n July 4, am’d sporadic skirmish fire, Major General Meade issued 
congratulatory order to his army but canceled the traditional 
* dependence Day salute to the nation lest the Confederates reopen the 
battle Late in the day, in heavy thunderstorms, Lee pulled back his troops to 
Seminary Ridge, abandoning Gettysburg and his line east of it. To withdraw 
bis army, he started his combat troops and 5,000 Union prisoners on a direct 
route for Hagerstown and then to the Potomac River crossings at 
Williamsport, Maryland. He sent by a longer route toward Chambersburg 
and then south to Williamsport his 17-mile-long wagon train of sick and 
wounded soldiers, all he could transport, while leaving thousands to be cared 
for by Northern military and civilian medical personnel.
Meade's cavalry followed Lee closely, but the Union infantry did not 
follow until July 5. Heavy rain that slowed Meade’s pursuit also destroyed 
the pontoons Lee was relying upon to remove his army safely across the 
Potomac. Thus, Meade caught up with Lee at Williamsport. Meade prepared 
to attack on July 13, but bad weather once again forced a delay. When the 
skies cleared on July 14, Lee’s army had crossed on rebuilt bridges. 
A frustrated Abraham Lincoln wrote Meade a letter bemoaning Lee’s escape, 
but he never sent it; instead, he publicly congratulated Meade and his army 
on their victory. Meade’s inability to mount an aggressive pursuit of Lee after 
Gettysburg still colors evaluations of his generalship.
According to official records, the Army of the Potomac lost 3,155 killed, 
14,529 wounded, and 5,365 captured and missing at Gettysburg. Lee's Army of 
Northern Virginia lost 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5,150 captured and 
missing. The raw numbers considerably understate the battle’s impact on the 
two forces, however. Approximately 5,000 of the wounded died of their 
injuries; Gettysburg's final death toll exceeds 10,000. Reynolds’s death, the 
wounding of Hancock and Sickles, as well as the loss of over a dozen brigade 
and division commanders shattered Meade’s senior leadership. Lee lost no 
corps commanders, but he soon missed their fallen subordinates; he espe­
cially lamented the loss of irreplaceable regimental and company comman­
ders. The two armies sparred at Bristoe Station and Mine Run later in 1863, 
but major active operations did not resume until the start of the Overland
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campaign in May 1864, when Lee once again took on Meade, now cnn 
ably overshadowed by the arrival of Lieutenant General Ulysses S Grant
The battle’s impact touched far more than the rival combatants. Hundr 
of Pennsylvanians incurred uncompensated damage to property and liveb 
hood. Gettysburg’s 2,400 residents struggled to provide for well over ->a 
wounded soldiers until army surgeons organized a system to care for them 
Within a few days, both curious gawkers and grieving families arrived th 
latter to retrieve the remains of loved ones - if they could be found. Trench 
graves crisscrossed trampled farm fields. Huge clouds of greasy black smoke 
from burning over 5,000 dead horses and mules created a stench that only 
peppermint oil or camphor could block. Teenagers made money by collect 
ing battlefield artifacts; several local children died when live artillery rounds 
exploded in their hands. Pennsylvania governor Andrew Curtin authorized 
local attorney David Wills to purchase land for a military cemetery, and Wills 
secured 17 acres on Cemetery Hill for that purpose. In time, Wills invited 
Edward Everett, the premier orator of his time, to deliver the dedicatory 
address and invited President Lincoln to add "a few appropriate remarks.” 
On November 19,1863, to an audience of perhaps 15,000, Lincoln delivered his 
brief, but decidedly eloquent, Gettysburg Address.
In time Gettysburg played a central role in inspiring a spirit of national 
reunion after the Civil War. John B. Bachelder, a wartime militia officer 
who became the first “official” historian of the battle, turned Gettysburg 
into a literary and interpretive battleground, one where the objectivity of 
history and the subjectivity of national memory freely intertwine even 
today. He invited veterans from both armies to return to Gettysburg, and 
his interviews with them helped him to approve locations for many of the 
monuments that still stand on the battlefield’s woodlots, hillsides, and farm 
fields. But he was also a hotel owner and entrepreneur who promoted an 
image of Gettysburg as the “high water mark” of the Confederacy and the 
turning point of the war to attract visitors. Although Meade’s victory at 
Gettysburg, both alone and when combined with Union success at 
Vicksburg on July 4, provided a welcome outpouring of excitement - one 
Philadelphia newspaper emblazoned “Waterloo Eclipsed” as a headline 
above its Gettysburg coverage - it did not last long.19 News of the 
New York draft riots, the failure at Fort Wagner in mid-July, the inactivity 
in the eastern theater in the fall of 1863, and the Union defeat at 
Chickamauga in September soon quieted the short-lived euphoria of July.
19 Philadelphia Enquirer, July 6, 1863.
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jjltirnately, the results of the Battle of Gettysburg did not change the 
strategic picture dramatically for either side. Lee did not surrender until 
twenty-one months later, and historians argue that Antietam, Vicksburg, 
Atlanta, the 1864 elections, among others, had more lasting impact. But 
popular memory still places Gettysburg above them all.
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